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Abstract 
Mobile agent paradigm is an evolving distributed computing paradigm. Different 
from traditional paradigms, mobile agent paradigm introduces autonomy, mobility 
and customization into the paradigm. Many applications can be benefited from these 
properties. For example, mobile computing is limited by its intermittent network 
connection and limited bandwidth. It can be benefited from the mobility of mobile 
agent to finish tasks asynchronously, and thus saves bandwidth and reduces network 
latency. 
Security issues are the most important part in implementing the mobile agent 
system. It decides whether mobile agent system can be broadly deployed or not. Both 
agent host and mobile agent can suffer from attacks. Comparing the two, the latter is 
more difficult to prevent. Although there are many protection schemes that have been 
proposed in the literature, there is still no satisfactory general solution. 
This thesis focuses on investigating the protection schemes of mobile agent. 
Firstly, we give a survey on existing protection schemes with classification and 
analysis. Then, we propose taxonomy of various attacks that may be suffered by 
iii 
mobile agent from its hostile environment. This taxonomy is useful for our further 
analysis on the possibility and efficiency of various protection schemes. Lastly, we 
propose a reactive mobile agent model. It has the property to communicate to hosts 
interactively. That means host can also get plaintext result from the agent. We will 
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The exponential growth of Internet has led us to a new Internet Century. Many 
services and activities such as information dissemination, entertainment or even 
electronic commerce have been moved to Internet. At the same time, fast evolving 
network and computer technology will lead people to be able to access the Internet at 
anytime and anywhere through their desktops, notebooks, mobile phones, etc. The 
traditional approaches to software design seem not sufficient for designing 
applications in such a large-scaled distributed and sometimes mobile environment. 
Then what is the next-generation computing paradigm? One of the promising 
answers is the mobile agent paradigm. Mobile agents paradigm have been the focus 
of much speculation and are hype in recent years. In this chapter, we give an 
introduction of mobile agents, mobile agent paradigm including strengths, 
weaknesses and requirements of this paradigm. 
Chapter 1 Introduction 
1.1 The Mobile Agents 
The concept of "Agents" is mainly used in the subject matter of two basic contexts. 
One is in physical world that the term "agent" or "intelligent agent” is a cognitive 
attempt to the explanation and simulation of human mental functions. The other is in 
software world that an agent is a software entity living only in a software world 
distributed among different types of computers. The software agents perform tasks of 
humans according to human-like roles/functions designed by software specialists. 
They are at some extent autonomous and intelligent. The movie "The Matrix" had 
given us a personification of "agents" both in physical world and software world. 
They are ideal agents with human-intelligence as they are autonomous, mobile, 
reactive and able to learn. 
In this thesis, the "mobile agent" is referred to as mobile software agent. A 
mobile agent is a software agent that can migrate from host to host, under own 
control, in a heterogeneous network in order to perform tasks on behalf of human 
users using the resources of these hosts. Agents are differentiated from programs by 
the properties associated with the agent. [FG96]. Although a concise definition for a 
software agent has yet to be reached, we can summarize some fundamental 
properties of an agent [Tod98, FG96] as follows: 
• Autonomous — Capable of existing independently; has control of it's own 
actions 
• Adaptive/learning - Changes its behavior based on its previous experience. 
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• Mobile — able to transport itself from one machine to another 
• Persistent -- A continuously running process; temporal 
• Goal oriented -- Not merely responds to their environment, takes the initiative 
to achieve its goal; proactive 
• Communicative/collaborative -- Interacts with other agents (and / or users) 
using an agent communication language 
• Flexible - Action are not scripted 
• Reactive -- Senses changes in its environment and responds in a timely 
manner 
Home \ I H3 ^ ) 
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Figure 1.1 Working path of mobile agent 
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Clearly, a mobile agent is an agent having a subset of above properties with 
"mobile" as the necessary property. Figure 1.1 shows a typical working path of 
mobile agent. 
1.2 The Mobile Agent Paradigm 
Mobile agent paradigm is a kind of mobile code paradigms. Different from the 
traditional client-server paradigm, mobile code paradigms introduce code mobility 
into systems that is more suitable in designing large-scale distributed applications. 
We can identify three kinds of mobile code paradigms: Remote Evaluation (REV), 
Code on Demand (COD) and Mobile Agent (MA). We give a brief description and 
comparison between the traditional client-server paradigm and the three mobile code 
paradigms below. 
Client-Server 
In client-server paradigm, servers are both the resource and code owners, which may 
be physically distant to their clients. The client-server communication is initiated by 
a client request to server for the execution of a service. In response, the server 
performs services and delivers the results back to the client. 
Remote Evaluation 
In REV paradigm, one party has code but don't have resources while the other has 
4 
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the resources but without code. It is the former party who takes initiative to send the 
code to the receiver who is the resources owner. The receiver executes the code 
received with the available resource and returns the result back to the sender. 
Code On Demand 
In COD paradigm, in contrary to the REV paradigm, it is the resource owner who 
requests the code owner to send code to it. The code owner, after receiving the 
request sends requested code in response. 
Mobile Agent 
In MA paradigm, the communication between parties no longer focuses only on the 
code transfer, but also on the transfer of partial computation results or state as well as 
some other resources that are also required for the computation. In other words, MA 
paradigm involves transfer of a whole computational component. Different from 
other mobile code paradigms, which are two-hop, mobile agent paradigm are 
multi-hop. That means mobile agent should be able to move from one host to another 
in order to finish its task without interaction with agent owner, only the final result is 
transferred back to agent owner. 
1.2.1 Initiatives 
The initiative to use mobile agent paradigm in distributed computing environment 
5 
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has been discussed intensively in literatures [HCK95, L099]. Compared to the 
traditional client-server paradigm, mobile agent paradigm has several advantages. 
a. Reduction of Network Traffic and Latency 
Consider the case when the code (the mobile agent) is small, the resources are far 
away, and a lot of interactions between code and resources are needed for finishing 
the whole computation. It induces much network traffic and latency tbr 
communication. If instead the mobile agent is moved to resources, the intcraciioiis 
become local and real time. 
b. Asynchronous Computation 
For a mobile user, using rather resource limited computing device, asynchronous 
computation is quite beneficial. By sending out the mobile agent, the user is free to 
work on other tasks without affected by the workload of agent's task. 
c. Autonomy 
Once the mobile agent starts their journey, they are autonomous to decide where to 
go and how to react to different situations. This adds “intelligence,, into the paradigm 
and largely reduces the intervention of human users. 
d. Customization 
In traditional client-server paradigm, functions and services are defined and 
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established on the server. Clients are confined to use these functions or services and 
without the ability to customize them. However, in mobile a^n t paradigm, users can 
customize or extend mobile agent's functionality to meet their own needs. Users may 
even create new services and implants them onto server that previously had to be 
installed by the service provider. 
1.2.2 Applications 
Although there is no killer application for mobile agent, there are many applications 
can be benefited from mobile agent paradigm. Several applications are clearly 
benefited from the mobile agent paradigm. 
Electronic commerce is one of the most interested and concerned areas in 
mobile agent application. Electronic commerce can utilize advantages of mobile 
agent paradigm in many facets. For example, purchasing require mobile agent to visit 
many different services providers and scan large amount of data. Commercial 
transaction needs real-time access to remote resources such as stock quotes. 
Mobile agent paradigm also benefits largely on mobile computing in which 
mobile devices users often has low bandwidth and intermittent connection to 
network. 
Other applications for mobile agent may include distributed network 
management [BPW98], workflow management [SWMEOO], runtime change of 
software [OMT98], making use of agent autonomy and mobility. 
7 
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1.3 The Mobile Agent System 
A Mobile Agent System (MAS) is a framework that implements the mobile agent 
paradigm. An mobile agent system consists of the mobile agents, the agent host or 
agent platform that provides execution environment to mobile agents and some other 
parties that coordinate and provide services to the whole system such as directory 
services, certification authority, etc. Thus, in order to host mobile agents, the 
involved distributed applications must provide a basic sets of services and 
characteristics as follows: 
Transportability 
A mobile agent has to be able to suspend its execution in a host, move itself to 
another node and start its execution from where it stopped. The transportation of the 
agent from on host to the other must be helped by external entities such as message 
services, middleware or e-mail servers. The system can either support weak mobility 
or strong mobility. [FPV98: 
Autonomy 
To cope with agent autonomy characteristic, the agent has to use resources and 
mechanisms that allow to making decision on where to migrate. 
8 
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Security 
Executing mobile agents in an open network with different administrative domain 
can cause serious security problems. An mobile agent system has to provide security 
mechanisms to protect both mobile agent and agent hosts. 
Fault-Tolerance 
The MAS must provide resources to the agent programmers for detecting any 
hardware and software errors. Procedures to overcome error may be to use 
alternative resource, waiting the resource to become active again [Sch97], etc. 
Performance 
The MAS must justify performance of the whole system when compared to other 
paradigms such as the client-server paradigm. 
1.4 Security in Mobile Agent System 
Security requirement of mobile agent system is the most important for mobile agent 
paradigm to be deployed into practical applications especially electronic commerce. 
Issues and security requirements in mobile agent systems have been reviewed and 
discussed in [FGS96b, GBH98]. Basically, the security issue in mobile agent systems 
include two large areas: 
• Securing executing environment from malicious mobile agents 
9 
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• Securing mobile agents from malicious environments. 
The first area is the traditional security issue. Most traditional protection 
techniques, such as authentication, access monitoring, audit logging, etc. can be used 
to provide analogous protection mechanisms for the executing host. 
On the other hand, a hostile environment can attack the mobile agent by running 
the agent code incorrectly, refusing to transfer the agent, tampering with agent code 
and data or listening into inter-agent communication. Security requirements [JK99, 
FGS96b] of mobile agents include the following: 
Privacy and Integrity: The state and data carried by the mobile agent can ha\e 
sensitive information such as credit card number, private keys, etc. Thus, both the 
agent code and agent data should be kept secret. 
Anonymity: The identities of the mobile agent should be kepi anonymous lo 
public. For a masked mobile agent, not only the identity of the mobile agent should 
be hidden, but also the hosts that it has visited. 
Accountability: If in case one or several of the hosts violate some of the 
security requirements, we must have mechanisms to account for such violations. 
Availability: There should have system mechanisms to ensure that mobile 
agents are allocated fairly and faithfully with host's resources. 
To protect mobile agent from hostile environment is quite challenging. Although 
research has been put on the issue, there are still no satisfactory solutions yet. Some 
researchers even think it is impossible to prevent such kind of attacks because mobile 
agent is under total control by its executing environment. This thesis will pay effort 
10 
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on the security of mobile agents in hostile environment by analyzing possible attacks 
on mobile agent and propose schemes to protect them. 
1.5 Thesis Organization 
This thesis is organized as follows. 
In chapter 2, the background knowledge on cryptography and secure function 
evaluation are reviewed. In Chapter 3, a survey on existing protection schemes on 
mobile agent is given. Different protection approaches are briefly explained and 
analyzed. The strength and weaknesses of each protection scheme is presented. 
In chapter 4, taxonomy of attacks on mobile agents is proposed. The taxonomy is 
general and complete and will be useful in our discussion on protection scheme of 
this thesis. The content of this chapter will be published in the paper “A taxonomy 
for attacks on mobile agent" [MWOl:. 
In chapter 5, a protection scheme on reactive mobile agents is proposed. The 
reactive mobile agent has the property that it has the ability to interactively 
communicate with the host in many rounds, and that implies host will also be able to 
get some plaintext result from the mobile agent. We achieve this by dividing the 
intermediate output of mobile agent into two: one is for agent state updating and the 
other is the output for host. An approach to prevent black box testing is also 
proposed. 
A conclusion of the thesis is given in last chapter. 
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Background and Foundations 
Many of the protection schemes involved in the protection of mobile agent are 
achieved by cryptographic techniques. In this chapter, we explain some of the 
cryptographic primitives [Sch94] that are related and the foundation knowledge 
mentioned in this thesis. 
2.1 Encryption/Decryption 
In an encryption process, an original intelligent message (M), or plaintext, is 
converted into a random string (C), or ciphertext, by an algorithm and an encryption 
key. Decryption is an inverse process of encryption. It transforms cipertext to 
plaintext with a decryption key. The encryption and decryption process are 
represented by: 
C = EnCki(M) 
M = Deck2(C) 
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In symmetric encryption scheme, the encryption key and decryption key are the same, 
that is kl = k2. We call it symmetric key or secret key. 
In asymmetric encryption scheme, the encryption key is different from decryption 
key but they form a pair. Only the decryption key can decrypt the ciphertext that is 
encrypted by a corresponding encryption key. It is similar to lock and key. We call 
the encryption key the private key and decryption key the public key. 
2.2 One-way Hash Function 
A one-way flinction is a function that is relatively easy to compute but significant 
hard to reverse. That is given x, it is easy to compute f(x). but is much harder to gel 
backx fromf(x). 
A hash function is a function that takes an input string of variable size and 
converts it to a fixed-size output string. 
A one-way hash function is a hash ftinction that is one-way. 
2.3 Message Authentication Code (MAC) 
Message authentication code (MAC) is a key-dependent one-way hash function. 
MACs have same property as the one-way hash function, but they also need a key. 
Therefore, only the person who knows the identical key can verify the hash. 
One simple MAC is to concatenate M and K first, and then computes the 
13 
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one-way hash of the concatenation. So if Alice wants to send the MAC for the 
message M to Bob, Bob must have the key K in order to verify the MAC. 
2.4 Homomorphic Encryption Scheme 
Ahomomorphic encryption is a public-key encryption function E such that given E(x) 
and E(y), we can easily compute E(x+y) and E(xy). 
We call an encryption ftinction E additively homomorphic if there is an efficient 
algorithm PLUS to compute E(x+y) from E(x) and E(y). 
We call an encryption function E mixed multiplicatively homomorphic if there is 
an efficient algorithm to MEXED—MULT to compute E(xy) from E(x) and E(y). 
2.5 One-Round Oblivious Transfer 
Oblivious Transfer protocol fulfils the following scenario: 
There are two parties A and B. A has two messages Ml and M2. B is allowed to get 
one of the messages, but is not allowed to get the other one. A should not know 
which message B gets. 
One-round oblivious transfer protocol fulfils the above scenario in one round trip. 
2.6 Polynomial-time Algorithms 
The computational complexity of an algorithm is measured by two variables, the 
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time complexity T and space complexity S. Both T and S are commonly expressed as 
functions ofn, with a "big O" notation, where n is the size of the input. 
An algorithm is constant if its complexity is independent ofn. 
An algorithm is linear if the complexity grows linearly with n. 
An algorithm is polynomial if its complexity is 0(n% for a constant t. 
Algorithms that have a polynomial time complexity class are called polynomial time 
algorithms. 
2.7 Circuit 
As defined in [Rog91]，a circuit C is a computing device specialized for computing a 
function from a fixed number of bits to a fixed number of bits. It is a (finite) labeled 
directed acyclic graph. Each node is labeled by a symmetric Boolean operator drawn 
from some fixed set of Boolean operators, such as AND, OR, XOR, and their 
negations. Input nodes are labeled xj,...,xi and output nodes are labeled v/,.. .v<；. 
Circuits provide convenient encoding for finite functions. In a natural way, a 
circuit C on i inputs and o outputs computes a function f with /-bit input and o-bit 
output. 
The size of a circuit is the number of gates in C plus the number of wires in C. 




Survey of Protection Schemes on 
Mobile Agents 
3.1 Introduction 
Different from the protection of hosts from malicious agents, which is a direct 
evolution of traditional mechanisms employed by trusted hosts, protection of mobile 
agents from malicious environments is more radically depart from traditional lines. 
This is because traditional protection mechanisms were not devised to address threats 
stemming from attacks on the application by the execution environment. It is exactly 
the situation faced by an agent executing at an agent platform that is not completely 
trusted to. The main problem is stemmed from the losing of initiative on agent when 
agent has moved to other hosts and has to be totally accessible by the agent platforms 
in order to be executed. 
Chapter 3 Survey of Protection Schemes on Mobile A^cni 
With the realization of attacks that mobile agents may suffer from hostile 
environment, a considerable body of work has been put on the protection of�mobile 
agents. These approaches can be broadly divided into two main categories [Vig98]: 
Detection and Prevention 
In this chapter, we will give a survey on the protection approaches already 
proposed. We are not intended to make an exhaustive list of detailed schemes but to 
summarize main approaches that were used. 
3.2 Detection Approaches 
This class of protection approaches aims to detect any unauthorized modification on 
agent code, state, or execution flow. This detects agent tempering after the attack, 
tracing the identity of the illegitimate attacker and proving its behavior. 
3.2.1 Execution Traces 
In [Vig98], an agent host is required to create a trace of an agent's execution. This 
trace includes the lines of codes that were executed by the mobile agent and the 
external inputs that were read by the mobile agent. Before the mobile agent moves to 
the next agent host, both the trace and the mobile agent's current state will be hashed 
and signed by the current agent host. This signed “commitment’’ will be attached to 
the mobile agent and sent to next agent host. Every host is needed to store a copy of 
the trace it creates and the commitment from previous host in a limited amount of 
17 
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time for later use in case there is any dispute. 
After the mobile agent returns home, if the agent owner suspects the execution 
result, a complete agent execution trace can be recovered. The agent owner can ask 
the first host for its trace and then use this trace to simulate the agent execution. The 
correctness of the execution of the first host can be verified by the oommitment 
stored in second agent host. (The identity of second agent host can be identified from 
the mobile agent's intermediate state). The whole process will be repeated until the 
last agent host. Any discrepancy in the intermediate will disclose the cheating agent 
host. 
This approach can detect all possible manipulation of agent, s code, state or 
executing flow. However, the detection of manipulation needs a human suspicion and 
thus not automatic. Also, this approach can only detect discrepancies after the mobile 
agent has returned home. 
The drawback of this approach is that it places heavy burden on agent hosts to 
create and store the trace, consuming large resources. 
3.2.2 Partial Result Encapsulation 
In [Yee97], the basic idea of forward integrity was introduced. According to 
Yee' s definition, forward integrity means if a mobile agent visits a sequence of hosts 
H = hi, h2, hn and the first malicious server is he , then none of partial results 
generated at hosts hi’ where i < c, can be forged. In Yee’ s approach, an offer by a 
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service provider is protected with a partial result authentication code (PRAC), which 
consists of computing a message authentication code (MAC) [MvOV97]. This 
technique requires the agent and its generator to maintain or incrementally generate a 
list of secret keys. The key used in computing the message authentication code at 
service provider i is kt and ki+i is related to Jqby a one-way funct ion/ such that ki+i二 
f(ki). Once a key is used, it will be destroyed before the mobile agent moves to next 
agent host, thus only the agent owner can reproduce the whole sequence of keys and 
verify all offers as well as the completeness of the sequence with the knowledge of/：/. 
A trivial problem to this approach is that agent host i can calculate the keys of kj for 
all j > i. If later the mobile agent revisits the agent host, offers after host i can be 
changed without detection. This problem can be solved by the scheme of Karjoth and 
his associates [KAG97]. 
The approach is to construct a chain of encapsulated results that binds each 
result entry to all previous entries and to the identity of the subsequent host to be 
visited. Each host digitally signs its entry and uses a hash function to link results and 
identities within an entry. It provides both confidentiality and integrity of the mobile 
agent's data. 
This scheme can detect manipulation automatically for those parts that are 
protected but the detection can only be made after the agent goes back to home. Also, 
it protects agent data but not code. Thus, this approach can be used in the application 
where agent data is much more important than agent code. One typical example is 
the data-collecting agent. 
19 
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3.2.3 State Appraisal 
The goal of State Appraisal [FGS96a] is to ensure agent has not been subverted by 
alteration of its state information. This is achieved by the state appraisal functions 
that checks whether the agent states meets some important invariants. The state 
appraisal functions are part of agent code. When an agent arrives at a host, the host 
will decide what privileges to grant the agent depends on the state appraisal functions. 
If an agent whose state violates the invariants, no privilege will be given. A restricted 
set of privileges will be given if the state fails to meet some of the conditional 
factors. 
However, it is not clear how well this approach can detect the modifications as 
the state space of an agent could be quite large, some subtle attacks to agent state 
may not be detected. 
3.3 Prevention Approaches 
This class of protection approaches aims at preventing possible attacks by making it 
impossible or at least difficult to attack an agent's code or state in a meaningful way. 
This approach can be either hardware based or software based. 
3.3.1 Sliding Encryption 
A simple solution to provide the confidentiality of the data collected by mobile 
2 0 
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agents is to encrypt the data. However, information gathered by a mobile agent is 
often small when compared to the encryption keys involved and the resulting 
cipertext. Young and Yung [YY97] proposed a technique known as Sliding 
Encryption that allows small amounts of data to be encrypted and yield etTicicni 
sized results. The method is aimed at conserving space rather than time. By using 
sliding encryption, mobile agents encrypt the information collected at each platform 
visited using public key, and decrypt it using private key when they return to home. 
However, this solution only provides confidentiality, measures to provide integrity 
should also be applied before encryption. 
3.3.2 Tamper-resistant Hardware 
Approaches that rely on tamper-resistant hardware have been proposed by Yee in 
[Yee97] and by Wilhelm et al. in [WSB98, WSB99]. 
In [Yee97], the basic idea is to encapsulate the whole agent execution 
environments inside the tamper-resistant hardware, which is sealed and can 
withstand potent physical attacks. 
A more limited approach [Fun99] is to assume only less powerful hardware can 
be installed in the system such as smart card. Therefore, not the whole mobile agent 
but the part that are security important will be protected by the tamper-resistant 
hardware. This makes a trade-off between the security and the cost. However, the 
security of this situation will become complex because the malicious agent host can 
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always control the communication between the protected and unprotected part of the 
mobile agent unless all the operations of the unprotected part can be verified by the 
protected part. 
Hardware protection approaches can protect agent from most of attacks, bit with 
high cost and is im-scalable. 
3.3.3 Multi-agent Cooperation 
Roth in [Rot98, Rot99] proposed a scheme with two co-operating agents. It is 
assumed that there are two independent subgroups of agent hosts, which will not 
collaborate with each other to attack a mobile agent. The two co-operating agents 
will migrate to different subgroups each time. These two mobile agents can then use 
secret sharing [Sha79], remote authorization, and remote storage of commitments to 
protect the applications. For example, mobile agent A can send the commitment from 
its host to another mobile agent B. B then can verify whether this commitment 
satisfies the agent owner's requirement or not. If it is satisfied, B returns its shares of 
a sufficient amount of electronic-cash to A. However, the drawback of this approach 
is the cost of setting up the authenticated channel. 
The scheme can be generalized to more than two cooperating agents. In [NC9S)J, a 
scheme called "intention shrinking" is used to shrink the spectrum of an agent by 
splitting the agent into many collaborating agents and letting them residing in 
different hosts. By doing so, we can reduce the amount of information disclosed to 
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any particular host and thus increase largely the difficulty to make meaningful attack 
to mobile agent 
3.3.4 Code Obfuscation 
Hohl in [Hoh98a] proposed a protection scheme that protects mobile agents by 
making agents' code difficult to understand. This includes a transformation from 
original code to obfuscated one. Hohl assumes the existence of a certain minimal 
time interval during which it is impossible for an attacker to understand the agent's 
code and make meaningflil manipulation on it. After the specified time interval, all 
the sensitive data inside the mobile agent should be invalid. 
This is a comparatively practical solution with much less complexity than other 
approaches such as encrypted function evaluation approach. The main problem of 
this scheme is how to specify a reasonable agent protection interval. Also, there is no 
theoretical foundation on evaluating the level of security of this approach. 
3.3.5 Encrypted Function Evaluation 
Sander and Tschudin [ST97, ST98] introduced a rather promising approach that 
provides hardware-like protection on mobile agent by using software only. This 
contradicts some researcher，s belief that mobile agent cannot be totally protected by 
software solution. 
It has long been believed that programs can only be executed in its plaintext 
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form. However, Sander and Tschudin questioned that how about if we can find an 
encryption scheme such that the cipertext is also executable. They proposed thai the 
encryption scheme exists if a segment of program code can be modeled as 
polynomials and rational functions. 
Consider the situation: Suppose now Alice has a function f and Bob has an 
input X, the function has to be evaluated in Bob's environment. Only Alice should 
learn the output of the function and Bob should not learn anything of the function. 
They should follow the computing protocol as shown in Figure 3.1: 
Alice Bob: 
f — m ) 棚 , 
E ( f ) — PiE{f)) , 
P{E{mx) — f i x ) < P{E(mx) 
Figure 3.1 Non- interactive Computing with Encrypted Functions 
In this protocol，Alice first encrypts the function f to get E { f ) . Here the 
encryption scheme is additively and mixed multiplicatively homomorphic. This 
transformation E consists of the encryption of the coefficients of the polynomial. 
Thus, the skeleton of the polynomial cannot be hidden. Later, a non-interactive 
solution for secure evaluation of log-depth circuits has been presented in [SYY99；. 
The evaluation is done in a gate-by-gate basis using a new privacy homomorphism 
for processing NOT an OR gates in a sure way. The restriction on the depth of the 
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circuit comes from the increase of the output size by a constant factor when 
computing an OR gate. 
Home ^ Host 
Figure 3.2 Two-hop agent Model 
Another similar scheme of encrypted function evaluation is the one proposed by 
Loureio and Molva in [LM99], This scheme based on intractability assumption of 
coding theory and supports those functions that can be represented by matrix. The 
overhead on the communication and on the remote host computational complexity is 
linear. The construction is quite cumbersome. 
All these approaches only support the scenario when the mobile agent goes to 
one host for computation and then back to home immediately. (Figure 3.2) 
Recently, a more powerful technique called one-round secure computation 
[CCKMOO] that combines the technique suggested in [Yao86] and one-round 
oblivious transfer [BM89] has been presented. This work extended non-interactive 
secure computations to polynomial-size circuits. Besides, this approach supports 
multi-hop computations so that a mobile agent may visit several hosts before back to 
home. Each visited host may use outputs computed on previously visited hosts 
without learning anything about the previously used inputs and obtained outputs. The 
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major drawback of the secure fimction evaluation is its computation complexity. 
3.3.6 Intention Spreading and Shrinking 
In [NgOO], a new notion of agent entropy is introduced to measure the spectrum of 
intention of an agent. This approach aims at spreading intention among collaborating 
agents so as to prevent any single malicious host from harming the autonomous 
agents. By intention spreading, such as adding noisy code to the agent, a host 
becomes more difficult to determine the agent actual intention. Similarly, by 
intention shrinking, such as splitting the agent into many pieces, the host can only get 
to know small portion of intentions of the agent. Compared to the code obfuscation 
technique that only re-configures the mobile agent without changing the global 
functioning, this technique changes the intention (or entropy) of the mobile agent 
also. By intention spreading and shrinking, even if the program code is in its 
plaintext form, the host still cannot get the exact and full information about the 
program intentions. In other words, instead of code obfuscation, this technique 
provides obfuscation of intentions of mobile agent. 
Although this scheme may introduce redundancy into the system, it can be an 
alternative or add-on to other schemes such as code obfuscation and encrypted 
function evaluation to further protect the privacy of mobile agent. This approach can 
overcome the inadequacy in code obfuscation or even encryption proieclion of the 
agent code in case the encryption is cracked. 
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3.3.7 Black Box Test Prevention 
In [HR98]，a protocol to prevent black box test of mobile agent is proposed. The 
main idea is to rely on a third trusted party to register every input and detect any 
re-input later, so a globally uniquely input identifier is needed. This identifier 
consists of the following: 
AgentID: Identity of the mobile agent 
HostID: Identity of the host as well as the number of visits at this host 
InputID: A unique number identifying each input of an agent 
Note, to include number of visits at the host in HostID allows a mobile agent to visit 
same host more than once. It is a required feature when a mobile agent needs to go 
back to the host that gives the best offer among others. 
As shown in Figure 3.3, before the mobile agent accepts inputs from host and 
starts to compute, the mobile agent has to put an input record (registry) on the trusted 
party. The mobile agent first sends a request containing the unique input identifier 
{AgentID, HostID, InputID}, an input data hash and an expiring time (Exp_time). 
The expiring time acts as a record keeping time, after the expiring time, the record 
will be removed from the trusted party. That means the mobile agent is no longer 
need to be protected from black box testing because any such attacks cannot harm 
the mobile agent any more. 
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Mobile Agent Trusted Party 
A g e n t I D , Hos t ID , Inpii tID, 
Hash(input) , Exp_t ime 
^ 
{Agen t ID , Hos t ID , Inpu t ID ’ Hash ( inpu t ) | ' 
^ or REJECT 
Figure 3.3 Input Recording Protocol 
In response to the mobile agent's request, the trusted party either return an 
"accept" or a "reject" message. If accept, the trusted party will sign the received 
message with its private key e and return to the mobile agent. Otherwise, the trusted 
party returns a special message “REJECT，’. The "accept" message will only be 
returned when there is no other record having exactly same identifier and data hash 
in the trusted party's database. 
After receiving the reply from trusted party, the mobile agent will check 
whether host accepts the record by decrypting the "accept" message with trusted 
party's public key d. Also, the integrity of the message can be checked at the same 
time. If the decrypted identifier and the data hash are correct, the mobile agent will 
proceed to execute, otherwise, execution will stop. 
This protocol is established under the assumption that mobile agent can be 
black-boxed in an efficient way. The cost of input registry can only be covered when 
data transportation is large. 
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3.4 Chapter Summary 
In this chapter, a survey of state-of-the-art protection approaches has been given 
followed by a thorough analysis of these protection approaches and their relationship 
and potential application area. Although much effort has been put on the issue of 
mobile agent protection, the existing solutions are still immature; many of them only 




Taxonomy of Attacks 
4.1 Introduction 
As introduced in previous chapters, mobile agent paradigm raises new security issues, 
especially the problem of malicious executing environment. Not only 
agent-executing hosts will have risk on inviting viruses, worms, Trojan horses or 
other kind of attacks that will damage their system, but also the mobile agents will 
have risk from hostile executing environment. Basically, a malicious host can attack 
mobile agents in many different ways: 
• It can spy sensitive information stored in the agent, such as user，s private key, 
credit card number, or data that have been collected from other hosts during the 
agent's travel. 
• It can modify the data and code of an agent, such as changing the lowest price 
or the decision logic in the scenario of a price-comparing agent. 
• It can even simply alter the agent code and data or even totally destroy the 
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whole agent. 
There are still many more! Then how can these attacks be done? How can they be 
classified? What is the seriousness of each attack? Can they all be prevented? We 
should first answer these questions so that we can have a clear direction to provide 
satisfactory protection to mobile agents. Although attacks from hostile environment 
to mobile agents have been studied in some context [Hoh98b, GBH98], none of them 
gives a formal classification of attacks. Taxonomy of attacks is, however, useful for 
research developments. 
In this chapter, we develop attack taxonomy for mobile agent under hostile 
environments. This new developed taxonomy will be used both in the evaluation of 
existing protection schemes and the development of new protection schemes. 
4.2 What is attack? 
When related to mobile agent protection, the term "attack" was rarely defined 
explicitly. However, before we can develop taxonomy for attacks on mobile agents, 
we should first define the term "attack". In [HohOO], a definition of attack was given 
by using the concept of a reference host (i.e. an abstract host that acts as expected 
given the same input and resource). Here, we define the attack in a more intuitive 
way: 
An attack is a violation of expectations of the agent programmer or owner caused 
by one or more than one intentional attacker(s). 
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Here the word "intentional" explicitly excludes cases when the violation is 
caused by unintentional exceptions such as errors, misinterpretation of specifications 
or technical faults. 
4.3 How can attacks be done? 
It is easily to understand that agents are vulnerable to attacks from its execution 
environment. However, exactly how these attacks can be done'? Hohl in [Hoh98b] 
introduced a model of attacks that can be the basis for understanding attacks. 
We here give a simple explanation. Just imagine that mobile agent will be loaded 
into an abstract machine when arriving the host. The machine contains the program 
code, memory cells, program counter, stack and stack pointer. However, the stack 
pointer is actually in the host memory, the host can always load an attacker program 
into another abstract machine in parallel when the agent is initialized in the host 
memory. The attacker has the power to access external environment such as with 
system information, code library and environmental variables. So actually, the 
attacker program can fetch and store the content in the memory and stack, or even 
the program counter and stack pointer in agent's abstract machine. 
Therefore, the attacker program can actually copy, change and delete any agent, s 
program statements. Or even worse, attacker program may monitor every execution 
statement of the agent program and thus can make the agent program to execute in 
the way it wants. 
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4.4 Taxonomy of Attacks 
Knowing how attacks can be done, we now investigate how can the attacks be 
classified. As stated in the definition that any difference in the real execution of 
mobile agents to the expectation of the agent owner will become an attack. Therefore, 
attacks also include those that are random without any particular aim such as just 
delete or change something without knowing what is actually being deleted or 
changed. In extreme cases, the whole agent will be deleted or destroyed. We will 
discuss attacks according to following two categories: 
• Purposeful Attack 
• Frivolous Attack 
4.4.1 Purposeful Attack 
Purposeful attacks are those attacks that are carefully planned and designed so 
that attackers can take advantage from the attacks. In the mean time, the attackers are 
conscious on what they are doing, why they do it, and what the possible 
consequences are by doing so. 
We will discuss the purposeful attacks according to two dimensions: the nature of 
attacks and the number of attackers. 
Nature of Attack 
There are two kinds of attacks that are rather different in nature. They are read 
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attacks and non-read attacks. 
Read Attack. 
It is the threat of attackers reading or copying the private data, code or even the 
flow control of a mobile agent. It leaves no trace that could be detected. That is the 
case when the attacker program just copy from memory or stack of the agent's 
machine and do nothing else. The actual effect may occur a long time after the visit 
of the mobile agent. 
We now analyze this kind of attack by following three levels of read attack: 
a. Data reading 
The most simple and direct way is to read out the private data such as secret keys 
or electronic cash carried by mobile agents. This simple knowledge of data 
results in loss of privacy and money. 
b. Code reading 
Knowing the code leads to knowledge about the execution strategy of the mobile 
agent. Consider the scenario that a mobile agent is traveling around the network 
for finding out cheap but high quality CD, malicious CD shop may use the 
knowledge about the choosing criteria to win the competition or record down the 
buying habit of the customer. 
c. Execution reading 
Combining with the knowledge of code and data, attackers can deduce 
information about the state of the agent. In the scenario of finding a best offer, the 
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attacker can recognize whether an offer is better or worse than the best offer so 
far by simply watching the execution steps, 
Non-Read Attack 
Unlike the read attack that leaves no traces immediately after the execution, 
non-read attacks involve the attacker actively making some actions and thus leaving 
traces. This includes many different kinds of attacks. Such as modification of code, 
data or even execution flows. Other attacks such as denial-of-service, black box 
testing, incorrect execution, incorrect input, are all fall in this category. 
Number of Attackers 
According to the number of attackers, we classify the attacks into two kinds: 
Solo Attack 
This kind of attack is those attacks that are done by a single attacker. A solo 
attack can encompass read attack, non-read attack as well as a combination of these 
attacks as long as it does not include any cooperation with other attackers. 
Collaborative Attack 
Different from solo attack, collaborative attack includes several attackers to 
collaborate in order to achieve an attacking goal. This kind of attack may also include 
reading attack and non-reading attack. For example, several hosts may collaborate to 
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track a mobile agent's path in order to 买t information about it or its sender. Another 
example is that when om of the attackers modified the mobile agent^s data or code, 
the other attacker ignores it. This kind of attack is sometimes strong and may defeat 
some of the protection approaches. 
4,4.2 Frivolous Attack 
In contrary to the purposeful attacks, frivolous attacks are those attacks that are 
not carefully planned and designed so that attackers may or may not take advantage 
from the attack. Attacker may change or delete some bits of the mobile agent without 
knowing what actually they are changed or deleted. Also, they do not know what is 
the effect for such an action. In extreme cases, they may totally destroy the agent or 
refused to execute the agent. 
We can classify this type of attacks into random attack and total attack. Random 
attack means the random change or delete of parts of the agent or just don, t execute 
some part of the agent or don, t give enough resources for agent computation. One 
may ask why this kind of attack will exist as it sems that the attacker have no 
motive to do so. Well, actually this kind of attacks does exist. Sometimes, because of 
curiosity or just want to try out something to see the result. Besides, It may be the 
indication of further purposeful attacks. One "good" facet for attackers to do so is 
that even when their action has been disclosed later, they can always excuse that it is 
because of some random error, or technical faults. 
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Figure 4.1 Taxonomy of attacks on Mobile Agent from Hostile Environment 
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Totally destroy the agent or refuse to execute the agent can be classified as total 
attack. In this case, mobile agents are either disappeared or cannot finish their tasks 
because of the refused execution. 
4.4.3 The Full Taxonomy 
Figure 4.1 shows the M l taxonomy. It is important to understand that in the real life, 
an attack may not just fall in one of the classes; several classified attacks may 
combine together as one in order to achieve a particular attacking goal. 
4.5 Using the Taxonomy 
In this section, we will show how the proposed taxonomy could be matched to 
the existing protection schemes to evaluate the effectiveness of the protection 
schemes as well as to bring out insights in making some new and innovative 
protection schemes. 
4.5,1 Match to Existing Protection Schemes 
Many protection schemes have been proposed to combat attacks on mobile agents. 
However, most of these efforts only fight one or several classes of attacks but not 
comprehensive. 
We now use the just developed taxonomy of attacks to give some evaluation to 
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existing protection schemes. In following paragraphs, we will briefly explain each 
class of protection schemes and illustrate what kind of attacks they can fight by using 
examples. It should be noted that not all of the existing protection schemes are listed 
here, but the taxonomy can still be applied to those schemes that are not list here 
Detection Approach 
Clearly, these approaches are effective for non-read attacks that leave traces for 
detection but not for read attacks. In particular the protocol suggested in [Hoh99] 
relies on the next host to check the status of the mobile agent coming from the 
previous host. This is also vulnerable under the collaborative attack when two 
consecutive hosts collaborate. 
Hardware Based Prevention Approach 
In this approach, secure hardware devices are used to protect agents. By using special 
trusted hardware as presented in [Wil97, Wil99, Fun99], even the host who is 
running the mobile agent cannot access the agent code and data. This prevents most 
of the solo attack but may not be effective for collaborative attacks. For example, one 
malicious host routes the agent to another collaborating malicious host without 
detection by the owner. In this case, other approaches must be added to fight these 
kinds of attacks. 
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Software Based Prevention Approach 
This class involves many different protection schemes each gives different levels of 
protection. Some of the protection schemes try to encrypt the agent data such thai 
only the corresponding receiver can decrypt by using public key encryption scheme. 
A typical example is [YY97] in which a mobile agent uses sliding encryption 
technique to encrypt acquired data by using a public key so that potentially malicious 
hosts cannot steal the data. However, these approaches can only fight against data 
read attack but not others like code read attacks and modification attacks. They are 
suited to protect the mobile agent with data privacy much important than code 
privacy. 
Obscuring a mobile agent's code to make it hard for reverse engineering is 
another approach. The one proposed in [Hoh98a] is a quite promising method called 
the time-limited black box security. This protocol can protect the mobile agent from 
most of the attacks but not long time read attack. Since it only protects within a 
limited time period, it is not suitable to be used in some applications in which mobile 
agents have to carry precious data that will be valid in a long time. 
In [ST98]，Tomas Sander and Christian F. Tschudin proposed a scheme by using 
encrypted function such that program could be executed without decryption. It means 
the host that mobile agents visit runs the agent in ciphertext form instead of plaintext 
form, so it is difficult to give purposeful attack to mobile agents. However, this 
approach only supports special kind of functions, namely polynomials and rational 
functions and does not prevent denial of service, replay and other forms of attacks. 
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4.5.2 Insight to Potential Protection Schemes 
From the discussion in previous section, we have some insight for developing new 
protection schemes. 
Firstly, not all applications require the same set of countermeasures. Instead, 
countermeasures are applied commensurate with the anticipated threat profile and 
intended security objectives for the application. 
Secondly, few protection schemes are suggested for frivolous attacks that are 
difficult to be totally protected from. Fortunately, they are quite similar to random 
errors, so we can use some fault-tolerant approaches such as error detection and 
correction to increase the survivability of agents. 
Thirdly, to totally protect mobile agent from read attacks is the most challenging 
part. The mobile agent needs to be executed by some hosts but at the same time does 
not want the host to be able to know what they have executed. Hardware dependent 
approach can be one direction but it results in high cost and is not scalable. Software 
based approach to fight read attack still have much room for further research. 
Fourthly, besides solo attack, collaborative attacks are also worth noting, as this 
kind of attacks can be varied largely and specific to certain kind of protection 
schemes, so in developing new schemes, we should always bare in mind 
collaborative attacks. 
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4.6 Chapter Summary 
In this chapter, we have presented taxonomy of attacks on mobile agent in 
hostile environment. The nature of various attacks is discussed. This taxonomy is a 
base for our further studies on protection of mobile agents and can be applied to 





Protection For Reactive Mobile 
Agents 
5.1 Introduction 
As introduced in Chapter 3, software protection approaches that can protect mobile 
agents from most of attacks are code obfuscation and encrypted function evaluation. 
The former protects mobile agents from a spying host for a limited time while the 
latter protects mobile agents with no time limitation. Encrypted ftinction protection 
scheme was firstly proposed in [ST98]. Sander and Tschudin recognized that, at least 
in principle, it is possible to completely protect mobile agents by software only 
solution applying cryptographical tools such as homomorphic encryption approaches. 
However, only functions representable as polynomials can be computed securely in 
this manner. Sander et al. [SYY99] later extended this to all functions that are 
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computable by circuits of logarithmic depth. Recently, Cachin et al. [CCKMOO] 
further generalized this to arbitrary functions as long as they can be represented by 
polynomial-size circuit. This is achieved by combining Yao，s "encrypted circuK" 
method [Yao86] for secure computation with a one-round oblivious transfer protocol, 
[BM89]. 
However, all these approaches protect non-reactive mobile agents only. That is 
mobile agent cannot have interaction to the host. In this chapter, we will propose the 
reactive mobile agent computation model and a scheme to protect reactive mobile 
agent. In our protection scheme, host can also get computation results from mobile 
agent and mobile agent can have several rounds of interaction to the host while at the 
same time without leaking any information of agent state to host. 
This chapter is organized as follows: Section 5.2 explains what we mean the 
reactive mobile agent and the computation model of reactive mobile agent. Section 
5.3 reviews the abstract version of Yao，s encrypted circuit construction and the 
technique to cascade the circuits without revealing every circuit, s output that is 
presented in [CCKMOO]. These two serve as the theoretical basis for our protection 
scheme. Section 5.4 gives the details of our protection scheme. Section 5.5 analyzes 
the security of the proposed protection schemes by looking at how well the scheme 
can combat various kinds of attacks. A special attack to the reactive mobile agent -
the black box attack is addressed. Section 5.6 improves our basic protocol to combat 
black box testing as well as frivolous attacks. Section 5.7 discusses some further 
considerations on our protocol. 
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5.2 The Model 
We first give a macroscopic view on the non-reactive and reactive mobile agents. 
Then, a microscopic computation model will be given. 
5.2.1 The Non-reactive and Reactive Mobile Agent Model 
In the following, the non-reactive model and reactive model are referred to mobile 
agent computation in one host only but not mobile agent's whole lifetime. Therefore, 
we here do not set any limitation on the number of host that the mobile agent can 
visit, so both active and non-active model in this section could be two-hop or 
multi-hop. 
Input ； — Output 
Mobile Agent Execution ^ 
Figure 5.1 The Non-reactive Model 
We say a mobile agent execution is non-reactive if the mobile agent accepts 
input and calculates output only once in one host. That is there is no inleraction 
between tiie mobile agent and the host during computation process as shown in 
Figure 5.1. This is the model generally used in encrypted function protection 
approaches. It is because once the function is encrypted, it only accepts inputs and 
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calculates the corresponding outputs accordingly. 
Intermediate Inputs 
Input Output 
^ Mobile Agent Execution Flow 
T • . . 
Intermediate Outputs 
Figure 5.2 The Reactive Model 
The difference of the reactive model and non-reactive model is that the mobile 
agent will have several inputs and outputs on a single agent host for reactive model. 
As shown in Figure 5.2, there are intermediate inputs and outputs during execution 
process. The next intermediate input depends on the previous intermediate output. 
Thus, mobile agents can have interactive communication with hosts. This improves 
the original model in the sense that it supports more complex and reactive mobile 
agents. 
Consider the scenario when a mobile agent roaming in network to book birthday 
cake on behalf of its owner. The mobile agent has the ability to bargain the price of 
the cake according to some strategies that are specified by the agent owner. The 
mobile agent should also be able to book the "best offer" cake. That means it should 
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be able to sign a booking order immediately after it has found the best offer. At the 
same time, the mobile agent will request the commitment from the host as well as 
challenge the host for authentication. All these requirements need a reactive mobile 
agent. 
Intuitively, we can regard the whole flow of computation of mobile agent in one 
particular host as composed of several consecutive computation sections. Let the 
computation between first input and first output be section 1, and second input to 
second output be section 2 and so on. We want each section of computation be 
encrypted and computed securely. Before introducing the protocol, let’ s study the 
computation flow inside the mobile agent more carefully. 
5.2.2 The Computation Flow 
Imagine the internal logic of a reactive mobile agent: to be reactive, it must be able to 
distinguish between different input of host and then react to that input of a host. That 
means the mobile agent must be able to decide the next action according to host input 
in a real time. Therefore, each section of mobile agent computation can be viewed as 
a mapping from many input values to a small set of output values (decisions). If there 
are several output values, then there will be several parallel sections each 
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C ^ ^ c t i o n C ^ ^ c t i o n S ^ ] ^ ( ^ e c t i o n 
^ Q S e c t i o n 
Figure 5.3 Computation flow of Reactive Mobile Agent 
Each node in the graph represents a computation section. The first node is the 
initial section. Every section may have several predecessors and successors. The 
former means different sequence of inputs from the host may result in same final 
action. The latter means different actions will respond to different input of host. This 
can be easily explained in the scenario of a bargaining mobile agent. Different 
bargaining path can result in final booking. The dark line shown in the figure 
represents one of the possible computation paths in a host. Note that all the sections 
will eventually converge to one section in the graph. It is because the mobile agent 
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will eventually need to conclude the computation in the host and calculate the next 
host to migrate to. 
5.2.3 An Example 
We now use the bargaining mobile agent aimed at booking a birthday cake as an 
example to illustrate what we have introduced in previous sections. 
Figure 5.4 shows a simple bargaining agent with only 4 sections. The agent's 
bargaining strategy is as follows: The maximum price that will be accepted is $150. 
If host input price is lower than $150, then the agent will book the cake immediately; 
If host input price is between $150 to $200, then the agent will try to bargain the 
price using a bargaining base $100. That is to take a average between the host input 
value with $100 and then output to host to see whether it accepts the value; If the 
host input is greater than $200, then the agent will not try to bargain and immediately 
request to go to next host. If the host accepts the bargaining value or input another 
price that is lower than $150 in second round, the agent will also accept, otherwise 
go to next host. Anytime when the agent accepts an offer, it will go home 
immediately. 
In Figure 5.4, some detailed variable settings such as minor state changes from 
section to section for flow controls are omitted for simplicity. This example is 
presented for an intuitive understanding on reactive mobile agent computation flow 
and will be used in our following discussion on the protection of such mobile agents, 
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Section 1: 
Maximun一accepted—price = 150; Bargaining_base : 100; 
Accept(input_price); 
If (input—price > 200) then OUTPUT REJECT and GO section 4 
If (input一price > 150 and input—price < 200) then OUTPUT (input一price 
+bargaming base)/2 and GO to section 2. 
If (input—price <150) then OUTPUT ACCEPT and Go to section 3. 
Section 2: 
Accept(input_price); 
If (input—price <= 150) then OUTPUT ACCEPT and GO to section3. 
Otherwise then OUTPUT REJECT and GO to section 4 
Section 3: 
Accept(booking order); 
Signing the booking order and set agent current—state 二 finish; 
OUTPUT signed booking order and go to section 4 
Section 4: 
If (current一state = finish), then go HOME 
Otherwise, calculate the next host and OUTPUT host ip. 
Figure 5.4 A simple bargaining agent 
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5.3 Tools 
In this section, we review the basic tool and technique we will use in our protection 
scheme. One is Yao's "encrypted circuit construction" or ‘‘garbled circuit 
construction" and the other is a technique to privately cascade the circuit without 
revealing the intermediate information. 
5.3.1 Encrypted Circuit Construction 
As we will use the encrypted circuit construction of Yao [Yao86] as our basics, we 
first give an abstract description of Yao's construction 
Here only those properties that are necessary to our protocol are shown Details 
and in-depth analysis please refer to [Rog91]. 
Assume there is a binary fonction g with two inputs x and y and output z, le. z 二 
yj. Now, let ( x ! ) , and ) denote the binary 
representation of jc, 7 and z respectively, and let C denote a polynomial-size binary 
circuit computing function g. Yao's construction includes the following two 
procedures: 
1) An algorithm CONSTRUCT 
This is a probabilistic algorithm that takes the circuit C as input and outputs the tuple 
(C, X, Y，Z) where C is a representation (or a encrypted version) of circuit C(.,.), 
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and 
Y = (Ti,o，^,i), 
Z 二 ( Z i ’ o , Z i , i ) ” . . , ( Z " z , o , Z " _ 7 , i ) 
In order to compute C(x, y), one needs a k-bit key for each input bit A', and i’,； The key 
Xi’b corresponds to the key used for the input x, = b and the key Y丨j) corresponds to the 
key used for the input yi 二 b. The pairs (Z,力’ Z,,/) represent the output bits. Thus, Y, 
Z denote lists of "key pairs" corresponding to x, 乂 z respectively. We call these 
'Iceys" the tags. 
Note that if we hardwire one input, say into the circuit C, then the resulting circuit 
is single-input and is equivalent to the original one by fixing value of v. 
2) An algorithm EVALUATE 
In order to compute the circuit C(x, y) in its encrypted form C, we should choose the 
input tags first. 
If the input bit X/ = 0, we will choose the tag J^a), otherwise choose Xu, Similarly, 
If the input bit = 0, we will choose the tag otherwise choose Y,, /. 
After choosing the tags for every bit of input x and y’ we can input these tags to the 
encrypted circuit C to get the output. 
Now let 
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X\ = X“xi for i 二 1,…，〜and X 二 Zi’； ,^义2’X2 .人 
for i = l,…’行y and r 二 7 ^ ， � 
The algorithm EVALUATE take the encrypted circuit and two sets of selected 
tags (which are representation of x and y respectively) as input and outputs either a 
special symbol REJECT or a representation of z. 
E V A L U A T E ( C , X ; Y O 
Therefore, from the output tags, we can easily get the output value z. If we get 
Z\ 二 Zi,o, we set output bit z/ = 0，if we get Z； = Zu, we set z / - 1. 
To explain in simple words, the encrypted circuit C ensures that given two sets 
of fegs representing its inputs, the set of tags representing the resulting output bits 
can be readily calculated. The existence of CONSTRUCT, EVALUATE is based on 
the existence of pseudo-random functions [GGM86] and efficient implementations of 
pseudo-random functions can be based on the Decisional Diffie-Hellman assumption. 
[NR97]. 
5.3.2 Circuit Cascading 
In [CCKMOO], a scheme is presented to secretly cascade the circuit without revealing 
the intermediately results of circuit computation. This technique is briefed below: 
Suppose there are two encrypted circuits, CI and C2, the output of CI will be the 
input of C2. We want to calculate the two encrypted circuits in sequence: hov\ c\ er. 
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we don't want to reveal the value of the output of CI before inputting to C2, we can 
use the following technique: 
The circuit constructor should encrypt each input tag of circuit C2 by using 
corresponding output tag of CI as the symmetric key. After encryption, there should 
be rix pairs of encrypted tags. We then randomize the position of the tags inside a pair, 
and called the randomized list U. The party who computes C2 only gets the 
encrypted randomized list U for circuit C2. In order to calculate C2, those output 
tags calculated from CI can decrypt half of the encrypted tags in U and thus recover 
the set of input tags representing current computation state for C2. However, the 
party is not aware of what has exactly been input to the circuit C2 because U is 
randomized in position beforehand, so it doesn't know whether the decrypted tags 
representing 0 or 1. 
Here note that the symmetric encryption scheme has the property that given a 
key K, one can efficiently check if a ciphertext represents an encryption under key K, 
which is in the same way as the encryptions for single gates in Yao's construction. 
5.4 Proposed Protection Scheme 
From the model we have introduced in section 5.2, we know that for a mobile agent 
to be reactive, we have to support the property that the mobile agent can also output 
something to the host so that the host can re-input to mobile agent according to its 
output. We say this can be achieved by dividing the output of the circuit into two 
54 
Chapter 5 Protection for Reactive Mobile Agents 
parts, Zx and Zy. One part represents agent states that should be kept secret 
throughout the whole path of the computation. The other part is the output to host. 
(Figure 5.5). The part of agent states can be kept secret by using the circuit cascading 
technique. For the remaining part of circuit output, we can send corresponding tags 
pairs to hosts so they can recover plaintext output. The detailed protocol is presented 
in the following sections. We first illustrate the protocol for reactive mobile agent 
protection in two-hop scenario and then extend the two-hop protocol to multi-hop 
protocol. 
X: Previous J , , „ +. \ 
\ / Y: Host input 
I / \ ^ 
Zx : Updated Z "output to Host 
Agent State 丨厂 
Figure 5.5 Relation of tags and encrypted circuit 
5.4.1 Two-hop Protocol 
In two-hop scenario, mobile agent will go only to one host for computation and then 
back to agent owner. We present our protocol in four stages below: 
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1. Agent Preparation 
The preparation work of agent includes encrypting all the sections of computation 
(ecliptics in Figure 5.3) as well as the computation links (arrows in Figure 5.3). 
Here, we use Yao, s encrypted circuit construction as described in section 5.3.1 for 
encrypting the sections. To encrypt the computation links (or agent states), we will 
use the circuit cascading technique as described in section 5.3.2. That is use 
predecessor's output tags as the symmetric keys to encrypt the input tags of the 
successor. If a section has more than one successor, we will encrypt each successor's 
input tags by the predecessor's output tags. Details are as follows: 
Encrypting computation sections: 
Agent owner O run the algorithm CONSTRUCT(C') for i - 1 s where s is 
the number of sections in the agent and gets the corresponding tuples: 
(C\ X\ Y\ f o r i - 1, . . . , s 
The output tags t are divided into two parts, one part is the tags that are used to 
represent updated agent state by section i, and the other part is the tags that are used 
to represent the output to the host. Let represents the set of tags that updates 
agent state by section i and Z'^ represents the set of tags that gives output to host 
by section i. Then is a cascade of Z'^ and Z'^. 
Note that the length of list X is the same for every /. That means the agent state 
should be represented by fixed number of bits. 
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Encrypting computation links: 
For each circuit C\ agent owner finds out the circuit's successor and do the 
following: 
For each successor d , use tags of Z'^ as the symmetric encryption keys to 
encrypt input tags of X" of CK That is: 
For eachk = 1, ... , iix, encrypts tag X “ under Z[力(for b = 0, 1), and set 
where Ck is a random bit chosen for each k.. 
Now, what we have got? To explain in simple words, the corresponding tags 
pair at same bit position of predecessor's output tags encrypts the successor's input 
tags pair for each bit representation. However, inside a tags pair, we don, t know the 
relative position of encrypted tags U to the original tags X because we have 
introduced a random bit Ck to randomly permutate the position of U inside a pair. 
2. Agent Transfer 
After the whole agent (including its computation flow) is encrypted. Agent owner 
will selectively send the agent to host such that only those parts that are necessary for 
computation are sent. Figure 5.6 shows a list of stuff that the agent owner should 
send to the agent host. 
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1. : Encrypted circuits for all the computation sections. 
2. X'^ : The selected tags for agent initial state. 
3. a K o K ) , ( U L o , U � ’ … ( 1 二 2，...，s) : Encrypted 
and randomized input tags for agent state for the encrypted circuits. 
(Note that a circuit having more than one predecessor should have more 
than one set of tags.) 
4. (71:0，巧:1)，(权0,7么1)”..’(7"'广0,7/7'广1) 1, 2，••• , s)： 
Host input tags for all of the circuits. (Note value of r^ may be different 
for different circuit.) 
5• (Z二+i，o，Z^+u), ( Z � 2 ’ o , Z〜+2，i )，•..，,0，Z,,�. ’丨) 
( i= 1, 2, ... , s) : Output tags representing the output to host for all the 
encrypted circuits, f^ote : value of n^  may be different for different 
circuit) 
Figure 5.6 Agent Transfer List 
Note that the agent owner sends all the prepared stuff to Hi except those output 
tags representing the part of updated agent state. Thus, host will not get the 
information of agent state. 
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3 Agent Computation 
After receiving the message from agent owner, the host should compute the agent 
according to following procedure: 
ci. Selects the input tags of C 丨 according to its first input to get Y' ' 
b. Runs EVALUATE ( c ' , X ' ' , Y ' ' ) , and gets Z 叫. 
u. Recovers output of C! from Z;, ‘ and Z 丨,‘ 
d. Determines the next encrypted circuit to be computed and the next input to 
that circuit according to the output from current circuit. 
c. Assume the next circuit to be computed is tag Z；' can decrypt one of 
the encrypted input tag U ^ orU'l^ for i 二 . After decryption, a set 
of input tags X'众 representing agent current state will be got. 
t. Runs EVALUATE (c众，X'々 ，Y") and repeat the steps c — e until the last 
circuit C is reached, 
g. Send the computation result back to agent owner. 
4. Final State Retrieval 
The agent owner O will receive a set of tags Z ' / representing agent, s final state 
from the host. The agent owner can then retrieve agent, s final state by comparing 
with Z / . 
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5.4.2 Multi-hop Protocol 
It is not difficult to extend two-hop protocol to multi-hop protocol. Assume that the 
mobile agent travels in a closed loop, fom an agent owner O to host H, and then 
from host Hj to host Hj+i for j = l , . . . ,m-l and then from Hm back to O. To be 
autonomous, the agent path is not fixed and can be decided by the mobile agent itself. 
We also do not confine the number of hosts that a mobile agent can visit. 
To let the next host can continue the computation using the result of previous 
host, we use same technique same as circuit cascading, but now the predecessor is C 
and the successor is C � I t is the next host that runs C' after C computed in previous 
host. Therefore, in agent transfer stage, agent owner O should also transfer encrypted 
randomized list U of section C^. 
Data that should be sent from to Hj+i, for j = 1, . " , n> 丨 ’ is nearly the same as 
that O sent to Hi except item 2 in the list will be replaced by output tags of C \ which 
represents the state of agent just before agent transfer. 
Finally, Hn should send last agent state (last output tags) to O. From what 
received, O can recover the final computation result of the agent. 
5.5 Security Analysis 
In this section, we give an analysis of security on our protection scheme by looking 
at how well it can combat various kinds of attacks. 
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5.5.1 Security under Purposeful Attacks 
Our scheme is secure under read attack. The host has no means to get information of 
agent code and data as it is encrypted or garbled. The host also cannot get any 
information of agent state by read as because agent state is represented by set of 
randomized tags from beginning to the end. 
Our scheme is secure under most of non-read attacks such as modification 
attacks. By encrypted circuit construction, host cannot make any meaningful 
modification to the mobile agent. If hosts try to execute the mobile agent incorrectly, 
or input incorrect data, they can only get a REJECT from the circuit output. For 
example, after section 1 is computed, the host is told to compute section 2. If the host 
does not follow and instead, it tries to execute section 3 that is also a successor of 
section 1 so it can decrypt the input tags for section 3, the host cannot be successful 
because the circuit is not allowed to do so by outputting a REJECT symbol. This 
kind of violation can easily be checked by circuit itself just looking at the agent state 
information. 
However, the above scheme is vulnerable to black box attack. Black box testing 
to mobile agent is a special kind of attack directing towards those mobile agents with 
black box property. In our reactive mobile agent model, outputs are also given to 
agent hosts; this special security issue must be considered. As now the agent host can 
try mobile agents as many times as it wants, until it gets enough information to guess 
the logic of the mobile agent. 
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Consider our simple bargaining agent example, the host can always run the 
section 2 many times with different values of input. If the agent rejects its offer, then 
next time lowers the price, otherwise raises its price, until the agent just reject the 
offer. Then the host can easily test out the maximum acceptable price set by the agent 
owner. That is $150! Certainly, agent owner doesn't want this to happen. We will 
improve our protocol in section 5.6. 
5.5.2 Security under Frivolous Attacks 
In our basic protection scheme, we haven't taken frivolous attacks into account 
by implicitly assume host will not undergo frivolous attack. However, if one of the 
sections is randomly erased, then the whole agent cannot be executed as expected. If 
the host destroys the whole agent, the agent cannot be recovered automatically. 
Therefore, if we also consider frivolous attack, as discussed in chapter 4, we can 
use many different kinds of fault-tolerance approaches. We will propose possible 
solution in next section also. 
5.6 Improvements 
In this section, we suggest possible solutions to combat the black box testing as well 
as frivolous attacks for our reactive mobile agent protection scheme. We first give an 
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5.6.1 Basic Idea 
As black box testing is to test the agent by running it with different input values, a 
direct and intuitive method is to ensure hosts can run or only able to run the mobile 
agent once. There is no way to prevent such attacks by agents themselves. It is 
because hosts can always duplicate many copies of agent, and am them in parallel. 
Therefore, we have to introduce a third party to supervise the operation and disallow 
a host to run the mobile agent more than once by inputting different values. Fvery 
time when host wants to input data into the agent, the host has to request the trusted 
party for approval. Computation of agent is allowed only when the agent receives the 
approval from the trusted party. 
One of the solutions is to apply a general protocol as proposed in [HR98]. To 
integrate the protocol into our reactive mobile agent model, each section that needs 
the protection from black box testing has to add the functionality of input recording. 
Host should input to each section not only its input data, but also the signed approval 
from the trusted party. However, this is rather impractical, as the complexity of 
circuit construction will become prohibitively large for such a complex function. 
Instead, we will propose another scheme that is an easy add on to our basic 
protection scheme. 
5.6.2 Input Retrieval Protocol 
Instead of using general protocol, we propose a new protocol for preventing black 
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box attack that is specific to our reactive mobile agent protocol. 
As host needs the input tags for calculating the encrypted circuit, we can control 
the host input by not sending the input tags to host, but instead sending them to a 
trusted party. Therefore, when the host wants to input to the mobile agent, it has to 
request the trusted party to give the corresponding keys. The detail could be as 
follows: 
The agent owner O will send all the stuff listed in Figure 5.6 except the item 4 
to the first host. The item 4 together with AgentID, expiring time and corresponding 
SectionlDs are sent to the trusted party. 
When the host wants to give a protected input to agent, it should send its input 
together with its ID, AgentID and sectionID to trusted party. The trusted party will 
then send the corresponding tags back to the host and keep down the unique input 
identifier (introduced in section 3.3.7) until time is expired. 
However, this approach is still vulnerable to collaborative attack. Imagine that 
when two hosts collaborate, one host sends an input, say Y, to the trusted party, and 
gets the corresponding tags. Then the other sends the complement of Y to the host, it 
gets the complement tags. By combining two, they get all the input tags and may 
then undergo black box testing attack to mobile agent! 
In order to prevent collaborative attack, we furtter improve our protocol by 
introducing dummy input tags. That is when we construct the encrypted circuit, we 
will embed some dummy input bits in the circuit C. Position of these bits are kept 
secret from host but revealed to trusted party. Each time the host requests for input, 
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the trusted party will send back the input tags together with the dummy tags 
embedded in. So even if two hosts collaborate, as before, they will be uncertain 
where are the exact positions of useful input tags. Although if many hosts collaborate 
in this case may still reveal all the input tags, we can at least tolerate collaborative 
attacks to certain extent depending on the number of dummy bits added. 
To elaborate more, we give a simple example. Assume the number of input bits 
is n, and we add also n dummy bits to it, then we have 2n pairs of input tags after 
circuit construction. A host HI sends nbit input to trusted party and gets back 2n 
tags. Another collaborating host H2 sends the complement of the nbii input, and 
then it certainly gets at least n tags that are different from HI. However, as the 
trusted party will randomly assign the tags at dummy bit position, on average, half of 
another n tags are same to that got by HI and half are different. The two hosts have 
to guess the positions of n useful tags by choosing n out of (n + n/2). 
One drawback of this scheme is the increase of complexity of the circuit, so we 
need to make tradeoff between the efficiency and the privacy. 
5.6,3 Combating Frivolous Attacks 
From Chapter 4, we have leamt that frivolous attacks are generally difficult to totally 
prevent from. However, we could use some fault-tolerant techniques to at least 
tolerate frivolous attacks to some extent. 
We may add error control codes at the end of each computation section, such as 
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Reed-Solomon code or check sums. In case some of the bits in the section are 
randomly changed, the error can be detected and recovered by error control codes. 
We may also add dummy codes to whole agent, such that the mobile agent can be 
recovered even if the whole section of computation is deleted. 
To tolerate total attack，cooperating agents approaches could be used. That is the 
agent under computation will send to another agent residing on trusted host with its 
most recent result. In case the mobile agent is destroyed, the cooperating agent could 
send a copy of the mobile agent with most updated state to host for continuing 
computation. For example, in our bargaining agent case, if a host H, stops agent 
execution at the middle, the cooperating agent can then send a copy of agent to next 
host Hj+i with agent state the output state of ！^小 Thus, the mobile agent computation 
can be continued through skipping the malicious host U .^ 
5.7 Further Considerations 
A drawback of using Yao' s secure circuit construction is that it is only efficient 
for small functions, its complexity increase significantly for more complex functions. 
Therefore, this scheme may be restricted to only those small applications. One 
example is the bargain agent with simple bargaining strategy. 
For larger applications, we may use encrypted circuit only for security sensitive 
part with other program statements in plain code. Or to be more secure, the plain 
code can be obfuscated first. For example, if we want to integrate the input recording 
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protocol into circuit of each section, the overhead is too large to be really deployed. 
But if we use obfuscated code to implement input recording part and let the result 
directly input to the circuit, the complexity is much lower. All in all, which method 
should be used depends on what level of security we want. 
5.8 Chapter Summary 
A protection scheme on reactive mobile agent is presented. Our scheme is inspired 
by the one-round secure function evaluation presented in [CCKMOO]. We explained 
the internal computation logic of reactive mobile agent by using the example of 
bargaining agent. We realized the reactiveness of mobile agent by separating the 
agent output into two parts, one is an update of agent state and the other is the output 
to host and thus host can also get the plaintext result from mobile agent form which it 
can decide what is the next input. Agent states are kept secret by using circuit 
cascading technique. 
However, this scheme still suffers from black box testing attack. We then suggest 
the possible solutions to combat the black box testing. We concluded that a general 
protection protocol is not suitable in our scheme and proposed a protocol that is new 
and specific to our protocol. It is comparatively practical and can be applied to 
applications that need several rounds of interaction between mobile agent and hosts. 




This thesis is focused on the problem of securing mobile agert from possibly hostile 
execution environment. This is a quite challenging issue that has given rise to much 
research interest. However, there is still no satisfactory solution. We have proposed 
our own protection schemes based on the analysis of possible attacks from hostile 
environment 
To start with, we presented various facets of mobile agent paradigm and 
compare it with more traditional implementation techniques. We pointed out that the 
mobile agent paradigm is most probably the next generation computing paradigm Ibr 
large-scale distributed and mobile systems. It is supported by the beneficial aspects 
of mobile agent paradigm: reduction of bandwidth and network latency, support of 
asynchronous computation, autonomy and client customization. We also suggested 
possible applications that can be benefited from mobile agent paradigm. 
However, there are many requirements for implementing a mobile agent system. 
Chapter 6 Conclusions 
The most important one is the security requirement, which is the prerequisite for the 
mobile agent system to be largely deployed into real life especially to electronic 
commerce applications. We discussed the security issues in the mobile agent system 
and paid emphasis on the security of mobile agents which is more difficult to fulfill 
because we to keep secrecy and integrity of mobile agents while at the same 
time give flill access to the executing environment in order to execute the mobile 
agent. 
We then surveyed different kinds of protection approaches that have been 
proposed in the literature and analyzed them with their strengths and weaknesses. 
Cryptographical background was listed beforehand to facilitate the understanding on 
the protection schemes. Based on the nature of the protection approaches, we 
classified them into two categories: detection approaches and prevention approaches. 
In chapter 4, we have paid effort on the analysis of various kinds of attacks that 
hostile environment can impose on the mobile agents. We developed taxonomy of 
these attacks. This taxonomy can be useful both in evaluating existing protection 
schemes and in inspiring the development of new protection schemes. 
We have proposed a protection scheme on reactive mobile agent in chapter 5. 
Our approach is one kind of encrypted function evaluation that aims at read attack 
and modification attack and can tolerate collaborative attack. We use Yao，s encrypted 
circuit construction as our basis. By cascading the encrypted circuits with a 
predefined logic, and outputting plaintext results also to host, we can support the 
mobile agents to be reactive. The output of a circuit is used as a symmetric key to 
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encrypt the input of next circuit so that two circuits can be securely connected 
without revealing intermediate state of a mobile agent. However, the black box 
property of encrypted circuit can be vulnerable to a special kind of noi>read attack, 
that is black box testing. We also proposed a method to integrate black box testing 
prevention protocol into our reactive mobile agent model. Further protection on 
frivolous attacks has been considered at the end. 
To summarize, although there are a wide variety of protection approaches to 
mobile agent，they are not compatible with each other due to redundancy in purpose 
and overlap in functionality. Prevention schemes ofien implicitly involve detection, 
so when all other things being equivalent, a prevention approach is preferable to one 
oriented towards detection as detection approach depends on legal or other social 
framework to penalize misbehavior. Also in order to effectively apply the available 
approaches, many of the approaches should be integrate into an agent system, while 
the others can be applied independently according to particular application. 
All in all, the area of mobile agent security is still in its immaturity, but rapidly 
improving. Mobile agent paradigm offers a new paradigm for application 
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